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This paper intends to contribute to the literature on the determinants of firms’ patenting performances. 
In this respect it puts forward several new hypotheses related to the relationship between the strategic 
management of innovation and patenting performances. It relies on an original survey questionnaire on 
innovation competencies, innovation strategy and the perceived innovation barriers of 148 large firms 
in Belgium. The econometric results confirm several hypotheses already tested in the literature, 
including the positive impact of firm size, market concentration and technological opportunity. In 
addition, innovation strategy (e.g., product vs. process innovation; university partnership; the share of 
basic and applied research in total R&D), innovation competencies (e.g., ideas storage and 
codification ; use of academic information), and barriers perception (e.g., internal barriers ; risk/cost 
barriers) are all significant determinants of patenting performances. 
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Strategic Management of Innovation and  
Patenting Performances  
 
Carine Peeters and Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper is about intellectual property (IP), “once considered the most boring subject in the world” 
[Rivette and Kline, 2000, chapter 1, p. 1]. The authors of “Rembrandts in the Attic” all too amply 
demonstrate that the ownership of ideas is now becoming part of the day-to-day business live, policy 
debates, and legal arguments. Indeed, publications on the strategic management of IP have recently 
flourished [e.g., Parr and Sullivan (1996) and Glazier (2000)]. This focus on IP is also witnessed by a 
vast economic literature, with both theoretical and empirical contributions.  
 
Pioneer work in the field of patents and IP probably started with the contributions of Schmookler 
(1957), Nelson (1959), Arrow (1962) and Scherer (1965). Since then, academic research has 
continuously and increasingly tackled various aspects of IP, from the theoretical analysis of patenting 
systems [e.g., Baumol (2002)], to the use of patent data to measure innovation performances and 
knowledge spillovers indicators [e.g., Griliches (1990)]. With the development of extensive and 
accessible patent databases, several authors have analyzed the micro-determinants of innovation using 
patent indicators [e.g., Duguet and Kabla (1998) and Cohen et al. (2000)]. This literature has two main 
justifications. First, innovation is considered as an important driver of sustainable growth. Policy-
makers and company boards are therefore interested in the firms’ patenting performances, as indicator 
of innovative performance.
 1 Second, patenting is a legal protection mechanism that avoids innovative 
profits to freely spur out to other firms or countries. Together with copyrights, trademarks and other 
legal mechanisms, patents are a central concern for all institutions involved in the generation of 
knowledge.  
 
This paper intends to contribute to the specific literature attempting to identify the firms and market 
characteristics underlying the large variance observed across firms in terms of patenting performance. 
In what follows we put forward and test several new hypotheses on the role of innovation strategy, 
innovation competencies, and the perceived barriers to innovation and patenting. In this respect, an 
original survey data on 148 large firms in Belgium is used. Two econometric models are developed to 
evaluate the impact of several potential determinants of patenting performances. The first one attempts 
to explain the probability for a firm to have a patent portfolio. The second one attempts to explain the 
breadth of this patent portfolio. 
The estimates show that the two models yield different results. All the significant determinants of the 
probability to have at least one patent also influence the breadth of the patent portfolio. However, there 
are much more factors that also play a significant role in explaining the breadth of the portfolio. 
Several, but not all, of the new hypotheses are confirmed by the estimates, underlying therefore the 
importance of innovation strategy, innovation competencies and the perception of barriers to 
innovation. 
                                                       
1  Patent-based indicators are one measure of innovative activity, among others. The validity of patents as indicator of 
innovation is debatable (Griliches, 1990), for three main reasons. First, not all innovations are patentable since the three 
conditions of non obviousness, inventive step and industrial application must be satisfied in order to get a patent application 
granted. Second, the propensity to patent ‘patentable’ inventions varies considerably across firms, time and industry [see for 
instance Scherer (1983), Hall et al. (1986) and Arora (1997)]. In some sectors patent protection is relatively inefficient and 
secrecy is favored as a mechanism to secure the rents due to an invention. The importance of the various protection 
mechanisms varies across industries and is very important for only a few of them, mainly chemicals and pharmaceuticals 
[Mansfield (1986), Levin et al.(1987)].   3 
 
The next section presents first the main hypotheses already tested in the literature on the determinants 
of firms’ patenting performances. Then, several new hypotheses are suggested. They concern the 
firms’ innovation strategy, innovation competencies and barriers perception. Section 3 develops the 
empirical implementation. It shows how the questionnaire has been built and presents the two main 
econometric models. Many sub-competencies have been used to create ‘aggregate’ competencies 
through a principal component analysis. The empirical results are interpreted and discussed in section 
4. The last section concludes and draws some policy and managerial implications.  
   4 
2.  Literature Review and Tested Hypotheses  
Pioneer work in the field of patents and intellectual property started with the contributions of Nelson 
(1959) and Arrow (1962). A few years later, one of the first empirical studies linking inventive activity, 
approximated by the firms’ number of patent applications, and some firm and industry characteristics 
was performed by Scherer (1965). With the development of extensive and accessible patent databases, 
several authors began to study the determinants of innovation using patent indicators.
2  
 
The recent studies on the determinants of firms’ patenting performances are summarized in Appendix 
1. They include include Crépon et al. (1996, 1998), Duguet and Kabla (1998), Brouwer and 
Kleinknecht (1999), Baldwin et al. (2001), Cassiman et al (2001) and van Ophem et al. (2001). Most 
of these studies focus on the determinants of either the number of yearly patent applications, or the 
probability for a firm to have applied for at least one patent.  
 
In what follows we present first the basic hypotheses that have already largely been tested and 
discussed in the literature. They relate to the firm size, competitive environment, technological and 
market opportunities, the propensity to enter into collaborative research, and R&D intensity. We then 
put forward several new hypotheses, which have little or no empirical validation so far.  They concern 
the domestic or foreign nature of firms, their degree of internationalization, their information sources, 
their projects selection processes, their product or process oriented innovation strategy, the perceived 




Hypothesis 1 – Large firms have a higher probability to have at least one patent and have 
 larger  patent  portfolios. 
  
Most econometric studies on innovation evaluate the impact of the firms’ size in an attempt to further 
test the famous Schumpeterian hypothesis that large firms are more innovative than small ones. This 
hypothesis has later been stigmatized as the fourth stylized fact of Cohen and Klepper (1996). The 
advantage of being large comes from three main factors, summarized in Cohen and Levin (1989). First, 
large firms can benefit from economies of scale and scope that make them more competitive in 
comparison to their smaller competitors. Second, large firms can benefit from complementarities and 
spillovers between different departments. Finally, large firms are favored by capital markets for the 
financing of risky innovation projects. Baldwin et al. (2001) find that the effect of the firm size 
depends on the innovation indicator used, with a weaker relationship when relying on patent data than 
when relying on the percentage of innovative sales, i.e. an indicator of innovation output. According to 
van Ophem et al. (2001) the effect of the firm size on its patent applications is debatable. Large firms 
can more easily rely on market lead to secure their innovation rents, and hence are less likely to need 
patent protection. However, they are better able to set up a patent department and to face potential 
litigations. Their econometric analysis shows a positive effect of firm size on the number of patent 
applications. Some authors find no significant impact of the size variable when it is controlled for 
other effects like industry effects, differences in access to external know-how and appropriability 
conditions [Duguet and Kabla (1998), Crépon et al. (1998) and Cassiman et al. (2001)]. Brouwer and 
Kleinknecht (1999) shed some light on this debate by using two different patent indicators. They find 
                                                       
2  Patent-based indicators are one measure of innovative activity, among others. The validity of patents as indicator of 
innovation is debatable (Griliches, 1990), for three main reasons. First, not all innovations are patentable since the three 
conditions of non obviousness, inventive step and industrial application must be satisfied in order to get a patent application 
granted. Second, the propensity to patent ‘patentable’ inventions varies considerably across firms, time and industry [see for 
instance Scherer (1983), Hall et al. (1986) and Arora (1997)]. In some sectors patent protection is relatively inefficient and 
secrecy is favored as a mechanism to secure the rents due to an invention. The importance of the various protection 
mechanisms varies across industries and is very important for only a few of them, mainly chemicals and pharmaceuticals 
[Mansfield (1986), Levin et al.(1987)].   5 
that the probability of having at least one patent application increases more than proportionately with 
the number of employees while the number of patent applications increases less than proportionately. 
This means that small firms that do apply for patents do it proportionately more, probably to 
compensate for disadvantages in terms of market share, marketing and brand name.  
 
Hypothesis 2 – Firms that face little competition have a higher probability to have at least one 
patent and have larger patent portfolios than firms facing intense competition. 
 
Another determinant of innovation that is quite controversial is the intensity of the competition firms 
face. It is measured either by the firm market share or by an index of industry concentration. The 
debate originates from Schumpeter’s hypothesis that firms with a higher market power are more 
innovative than firms with weak market power. This hypothesis has later been challenged by several 
authors. Two effects work indeed in opposite directions. On the one hand there is the replacement 
effect implying that firms with more power on the market invest less in innovation because the gains 
they would get would only replace current gains (Arrow, 1962). On the other hand there is the 
efficiency effect following which firms with a high market power invest more in innovation because 
they do not face competition for the exploitation of their inventions (Gilbert and Newberry, 1982). The 
impact of this variable varies quite importantly according to the innovation indicator used. Results of 
studies using the same innovation indicator can also be very different, as argued by Cohen and Levin 
(1989) in their review of the literature on the relationship between R&D and market power. 
Concerning the number of patent applications, Duguet and Kabla (1998) and Nielsen (2001) find a 
positive influence of the firm market power, i.e. the efficiency effect seems to dominate the 
replacement effect.  
 
Hypothesis 3 – Firms in high technological opportunity sectors have a higher probability to 
have at least one patent and have larger patent portfolios than firms in low technological 
opportunity sectors. 
 
The technological opportunity is generally measured at the industry level and has been defined by 
Levin  et al. (1987) as the extent to which an industry relies on science-based research. The 
technological opportunity is expected to positively influence R&D investments. The innovation output 
will probably be more influenced by market-related variables because it is more directly linked to the 
market. In this respect, the status of patent indicators is controversial. Patents are a kind of 
intermediate indicator reflecting the output of research activities but not necessarily implying the 
commercialization of an invention. Firms in high technological opportunity sectors are found to patent 
more than other firms [Crépon et al. (1996, 1998) and Brouwer and Kleinknecht (1999)] but the 
difference is not always significant [Duguet and Kabla (1998) and Baldwin et al. (2001)]. Concerning 
the market-related variables, Crépon et al. (1996) find that they have a positive and significant impact 
on patent applications, but the effect is generally found insignificant [Duguet and Kabla (1998), 
Crépon et al. (1998) and Cassiman et al. (2000)].  
 
Hypothesis 4 – A higher R&D intensity is associated with a higher probability to have at least 
one patent, and with a larger patent portfolio. 
 
Another issue that has largely been studied in the literature is the relationship between R&D and 
patents. Scherer (1965) considers patents as an indicator of R&D success. In this perspective R&D 
precedes patent applications and the causality goes from R&D to patents, with R&D being eventually 
lagged in the equations. More recently, Hall et al. (1986) argue that there is a strong contemporaneous 
effect between R&D and patenting and that it is difficult to find the adequate lag structure between 
R&D and patents. One could say that the lag structure is less important that it might seem because 
once a research unit is established in a company it is likely to invest a relatively stable amount of 
resources and to generate a quite constant flow of patents. Most studies including an R&D indicator in 
the patent equations find a positive and significant relationship [Duguet and Kabla (1998), Crépon et 
al. (1998) and Brouwer and Kleinknecht (1999)]. However, recent evidence shows that one additional 
patent application induces an increase in R&D four years later (van Ophem et al., 2001) and that four   6 
years lagged R&D expenditures do not influence patent applications [van Ophem et al. (2001) and 
Cincera (1997)]. These results have thrown back the discussion about the causality link between R&D 
and patents. Actually, the relationship between R&D and patents could be seen as a virtuous cycle. 
The former induces the later, which in turn requires further development costs in order to reach 
profitability. 
 
Hypothesis 5 – Taking part in research partnerships leads to a higher probability of having at 
least one patent, and to larger patent portfolios. 
 
Using a dummy variable, Brouwer and Kleinknecht (1999) and van Ophem et al. (2001) find that the 
firms participating in research partnership and collaboration apply for more patents than the firms that 
are more ‘inward’ looking. Firms can collaborate with various types of partners: competitors, vertical 
partners, universities, consultants, complementary firms and other firms of the same group. These 
institutions form an external stock of knowledge that might prove useful for the firms’ own innovation 
activities. A research collaborative agreement implies a mutual access to the partners’ knowledge base. 
Therefore, collaborative firms would be more likely to seek patent protection for their own knowledge 
base. Moreover, when patented, the firm knowledge base becomes a tradable asset that can reveal very 




Other hypotheses about the determinants of patenting performances have not been subject to a wide 
empirical validation yet or have not been suggested so far. They are related to the firm strategy (i.e., 
process vs. product innovation, diversification, degree of internationalization), its innovation 
competencies (i.e., information sources, project selection processes), its perception of barriers to 
innovation, its perception of the effectiveness of the patent system, its geographical origin (i.e. 
domestic vs foreign firm), and its age.  
 
Hypothesis 6 – Foreign firms have a higher probability to have at least one patent and have 
larger patent portfolios.  
 
Another variable eventually included in patent regressions is the firm’s geographical origin. The issue 
is to test whether foreign firms have better patenting performances than local firms. A common 
thought is that foreign firms are more innovative than local ones. As a consequence they are likely to 
patent more. Since foreign firms are subsidiaries of sister companies it could be argued that they are 
less involved in patenting. Patents could indeed be managed at the group level, in the country of origin. 
This hypothesis is tested and confirmed by Baldwin et al. (2001) on Canadian firms’ survey data. 
 
  Hypothesis 7 – Firms that look for information beyond their boundaries have a higher 
  probability to have at least one patent, and have larger patent portfolios. 
 
There are various potential external information sources firms can use in their innovation projects. 
There are the customers, suppliers and competitors, scientific institutions like universities and research 
institutes, consultants, and also patent databases, the scientific literature and market surveys. Looking 
globally to these information sources, Cassiman et al. (2001) find a positive relationship between the 
recourse to various information sources and the firm propensity to patent. 
 
Hypothesis 8a – The importance of the development of new products in a firm’s strategy is 
associated with a higher probability to have at least one patent, and to a larger patent 
portfolio. 
Hypothesis 8b – The importance of the development of new processes in a firm’s strategy is 
associated with a weaker probability to have at least one patent, and to a smaller patent 
portfolio. 
   7 
It is traditionally found that process innovations are less likely to be patented [Arundel and Kabla 
(1998) and Brouwer and Kleinknecht (1999)] and that secrecy is a more appropriate protection 
mechanism for this type of innovation [Cohen et al(2000)]. It is indeed more difficult to track down 
imitations of processes than imitations of products. Therefore, the publication of technical information 
a patent requires might be more worthwhile in the case of a product innovation, for which 
infringement is easier to detect. Moreover, imitating a process innovation might be more difficult than 
a product innovation because a lot of specific know-how is generally needed in order to make use of a 
new process, specific expertise that potential imitators are lacking. Firms might therefore opt for a non 
legal protection mechanism such as secrecy. At the opposite, product innovations might be easier to 
imitate through reverse-engineering and a legally enforceable protection with patents might be 
necessary. 
 
Hypothesis 9 – Firms that perceive a higher “ineffectiveness” of the patent system and a 
higher cost of patenting have a lower probability to have at least one patent, and have smaller 
patent portfolios. 
 
The advantage for a firm to patent an invention is not always clear since a patent offers protection to 
its holder at the high indirect cost of revealing important technical information. Actually, applying for 
a patent does not seem to be the most popular protection mechanism for manufacturing firms, which 
often favor secrecy and lead time over competition [Levin et al. (1987), Brouwer and Kleinknecht 
(1999) and Cohen et al. (2000), Arundel (2001)]. The risk to face competitors “inventing around” and 
the disclosure of critical information are found to be the most important reasons why patents are not 
always efficient at protecting innovation rents [Levin et al. (1987), Scotchmer and Green (1990) and 
Cohen  et al. (2000)]. For instance, Mansfield et al. (1981) found that patent protection does not 
increase imitation time and costs dramatically. Patent costs influence the behavior of small and large 
firms differently. The high costs of application and litigation prevent small firms to use the patent 
system more intensely while large firms seem more able to afford the fixed costs associated with a 
patent (Cohen, 1995). 
 
Hypothesis 10 – Firms that highlight more barriers to innovation have a lower probability to 
have at least one patent, and have smaller patent portfolios. 
 
Some authors use innovation survey data to test the effect of potential barriers to innovation on the 
firms innovation activities [Lööf and Heshmati (2002) and Veugelers and Cassiman (1999)]. They 
generally find that a lack of interest from customers, a lack of technological information and a lack of 
qualified personnel have a negative impact on firms’ innovation. At the opposite, the lack of external 
financial means and costs (and risks) barriers positively affect innovation. It must be noticed that the 
positive impact concerns the firms’ innovation performances, measured as the level of innovation 
investment by Lööf and Heshmati (2002) and as the decision to innovate or not by Veugelers and 
Cassiman (1999). Innovation barriers could also have an impact on the firms’ patenting performances, 
as indicator of innovation involvement and R&D success. Cassiman et al (2001) find that high 
innovation costs and lack of financing have a positive effect on the firms’ propensity to patent. This 
counter-intuitive positive effect highlights a recurrent problem of measurement of the barriers to 
innovation. Indeed it is often difficult to discern the firms’ perception of the barriers from the barriers 
that effectively hinder the firms’ innovation efforts and their patenting performances. 
 
Hypothesis 11 – The youngest and oldest firms have a higher probability to have at least one 
patent and have larger patent portfolios than firms of intermediate age. 
 
The firm age could influence its patent portfolio in two opposite directions. Young firms might be 
more dynamic and have a less rigid structure favorable to innovation, and hence patenting. However, 
over time, older firms might have built a larger technological expertise protected by a larger number of 
patents. They also probably have more resources to sustain strong patenting strategies. The 
relationship between the firm age and its patenting performances might therefore be U-shaped with 
better performances for young and old firms as opposed to firms of intermediate age.   8 
 
Hypothesis 12 – Firms with a higher degree of internationalization have a higher probability 
of having at least one patent, and have larger patent portfolios.  
 
Firms operating in a large number of countries can be expected to have better patenting performances 
for two main reasons. First, they face a larger potential market than firms operating more in their local 
or regional market and they face more international competition. Both aspects increase the need for 
higher innovation efforts. The number of countries in which a firm operates would reflects some kind 
of market opportunity effect. Second, an international competition increases the need for innovation 
rents protection because the number of potential imitators increases and infringement is more difficult 
to detect. This would translate into a higher propensity to patent innovations on a global scale 
 
  Hypothesis 13 – A better projects selection process leads to a higher probability of patenting 
  and to larger patent portfolios. 
 
Only a small share of innovative ideas receives the necessary resources to enter into the development 
phase. And much fewer reach large scale production and commercialization. Therefore, firms need to 
have an efficient ideas selection process enabling them to track down the projects to push forward 
[Montoya-Weiss (2000), Cooper et al. (2001)], i.e. the ones that will most probably lead to important 
profits. As indicator of R&D success we might expect the patent portfolios to be positively influenced 
by the capacity of firms to implement an efficient projects selection process. A good selection process 
might rely on a systematic storage of innovative ideas, on an IT-based knowledge codification system, 
on a formal estimation procedure of the probability of success of the projects, and on a good 
assessment of the potential barriers to innovation beforehand. 
 
Hypothesis 14 – A higher proportion of basic and applied research in total R&D budget leads 
to a higher probability of patenting and to larger patent portfolios. 
 
If the positive relationship between the relative effort in research and patenting has been widely 
illustrated, there is no evidence so far about the content of R&D. R&D is traditionally composed of 
basic research, applied research and development. Since patents are by definition a codification of an 
invention, they might rather be the outcome of basic and applied research as opposed to development 
activities. The latter would surely be associated with patenting (development of inventions), but 
provided a sufficient share of total R&D is devoted to basic and applied research.   9 
3. Empirical  Implementation 
Two main models are used in order to identify the determinants of firms’ patenting performances. The 
first one focuses on whether firms have a patent portfolio or not, i.e. the probability for a firm to have 
at least one patent. The second one intends to explain the breadth of this portfolio, i.e. the number of 
patents a firm has in its patent portfolio. This dual approach has already been adopted by some authors 
like Crépon et al. (1996, 1998) and Brouwer and Kleinknecht (1999). However, they used information 
about the number of yearly patent applications while our data concern all patents in force in the firms’ 
patent portfolio.  
 
- Insert figure 1 around here - 
 
The empirical methodology is illustrated in figure 1. In the left-hand side box are the 19 explanatory 
variables included in the two models and the number of the related theoretical hypotheses. On the 
right-hand side boxes are the econometric models used and the corresponding dependent variables. A 
binary logit model is used to estimate the probability for a firm to have at least one patent. A count 
model with a negative binomial specification is used to estimate the breadth of the patent portfolio.
3  
 
The data used in this study come from an original survey on firms’ innovation competencies and 
performances in Belgium. The questionnaire was sent to the CEO’s of 1301 large firms active in all 
sectors in Belgium. A total of 148 questionnaires were filed and sent back. However, due to missing 
data, only 97 questionnaires could be used in this study. An extensive statistical analysis of the survey 
results can be found in Peeters and van Pottelsberghe (2003). The sample composition and summary 
statistics are provided in table 1.  
 
- Insert table 1 around here - 
 
Less than half the firms of the sample claim to have at least one patent. The average patent portfolio is 
composed of 33 patents. However, the standard deviation of this variable is very large. The average 
firm of the sample counts 595 employees, is 34 years old and is operating in 25 different countries. 
Nearly half the firms of the sample are foreign firms active in Belgium and 37% belong to a high-tech 
or medium high-tech industry. Concerning the R&D activities, 93% of firms claim to have some kind 
of R&D activity. On average the sample allocates 35% of its R&D budget to basic and applied 
research, as opposed to development activities. Finally, 42% of firms give a high importance to 
process innovation. This is higher than the percentage of firms that give a high importance to product 
innovation (32%). 
 
There are two types of variables used in this study: binary and numerical variables. Part of the 
numerical variables are the firms’ coordinates on various factorial axes representing the type of 
partnerships, information sources, the firms’ projects selection process and potential barriers to 
innovation and to patenting. The construction of the factorial axes is explained in appendix 2. 
 
The explanatory variables are grouped into four categories: control variables, strategic variables, 
competencies variables and barriers-related variables.
4  These variables enable to test the hypotheses 
presented in the previous section.  
 
The Control Variables 
The control variables include the firm size, age, country of origin, its industry concentration and an 
indicator of its technological opportunity.  
                                                       
3 The breadth of the patent portfolio has also been estimated with a censored logistic model in order to check the robustess of 
the estimates. The results are presented in Appendix 5; they confirm the estimates of the negative binomial model. 
4 Appendix 3 presents a synthetic table with the definition of variables.   10 
 
   The firm size is measured by the total number of employees in the firm or branch.   
   The firm age is the number of years, in 2000 at the time of the survey, since the creation of 
the company. The square of the firm age is also introduced to check for potential non linear 
relationship with the firms’ patenting performances. 
   The firm country of origin is proxied by a binary variable taking the value of 1 if the firm 
belongs to a foreign group and 0 if not. 
   The sector concentration is proxied by a C-4 index, i.e. the total sales of the four largest firms 
in the firm’s main sector of operation (in terms of sales) divided by the total sales of the sector 
of activity. This is an imperfect variable since it is measured at the Belgian level while a lot of 
firms have international competitors. Moreover it is based on firms operating in the same kind 
of activity and do not necessarily reflects the firms’ direct competitors. 
   The sector technological opportunity variable is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the 
firm belongs to a high-tech (HT) or medium-high-tech (MH) sector and 0 if not
5.  
 
The Strategic Variables 
The strategic variables include the degree of internationalization, the relative importance of the 
development of new products and new processes in the firm global strategy, the share of basic and 
applied research in total R&D budget, and the firm’s research partnerships.  
 
   The degree of internationalization is proxied by the number of countries a firm is operating 
in. A firm is considered to operate in a country if it has customer contacts in this country. 
   The effect of the innovation strategy (product-oriented and / or process-oriented) on the 
firms’ patenting performances is studied thanks to two dummy variables. They take the value 
of 1 if the firm answered 4 or 5 (on a Likert scale ranging from 0 to 5) to the question of the 
importance of product innovation, and to the question of the importance of process 
innovation. A firm can therefore be oriented towards both types of innovations, they are not 
mutually exclusive. 
   When studying the link between R&D activities and firms’ patenting performances we focus 
on the relative importance of basic and applied research in the total R&D budget, as opposed 
to development activities.
6  
   Another strategic decision the firm has to take is the involvement in research partnerships. 
Two variables based on a factorial analysis take this factor into account. The first one reflects 
the collaborations with universities and research institutes. The second one reflects the 
collaborations with competitors and negatively relates to the use of consultants and vertical 
partners as innovation partners. Both variables are expected to have a positive impact on the 
firms’ patent portfolio. The main reason for a positive impact of the universities and research 
institutes partnerships would come from the basic nature of academic research. Collaborating 
with competitors implies reciprocal openness and access to the firms’ knowledge base. The 
need for patent protection would therefore be more required. 
 
 The Competencies Variables 
The competencies variables come from several factorial analyses of the basic survey data. They 
include the information sources used by firms and the extent to which they implement an efficient 
                                                       
5  The sector technological opportunity is similar to the OECD classification: HT= aeronautic construction, desks and 
computing machines, pharmaceuticals products, radio, TV and telecommunication machines, and MH= professional 
equipment, motorcar vehicles, electric machines, chemical industries, other transport equipment, non-electric machines.  
6 The effect of the firms’ total R&D intensity (percentage of sales allocated to R&D) has been tested too. This variable 
proved significant only in the count model at the 15% level and not in the binary model. The firms’ R&D intensity has thus 
some determining influence for the breadth of the firms’ patent portfolio but not for the probability of patenting.  Moreover, 
the introduction of this variable induced a sharp decrease in the number of observations due to a low response rate (the firms 
were more willing to provide information on the composition of their R&D activities than their total budget for R&D). 
Therefore the R&D intensity was not included in the final regressions. 
   11 
projects selection process. These competencies were composed of questions for several sub-
competencies (see appendix 2 and Peeters and van Pottelsberghe, 2003). A principal component 
analysis allowed to identify the relationship between the sub-competencies and to use the coordinates 
of the firms on one or two factorial axes. The number of axes (1 to 3) was chosen so that more than 50 
per cent of the variance across firms was explained. 
 
   Two variables reflect the information sources firms use for their innovative projects. The first 
one represents the importance firms give to consultants, competitors and vertical partners as 
information source for their innovation projects. The second one represents the importance of 
universities and research institutes. We expect universities and research institutes information 
to have a positive effect on the firms’ patenting performances. These institutions traditionally 
develop basic knowledge useful to firms seeking to launch quite radical innovations, which 
are more likely to be patented. The impact of the other sources of information is more 
ambiguous. Consultants, customers and suppliers are commercial partners that provide 
mainly non technical information. The link with the firms’ patenting performances is thus 
less straightforward.  
   Another factorial analysis is used to build two variables related to the firms’ projects 
selection process. The first variable (i.e. the firms’ coordinates on the first factorial axis 
related to the projects selection process) reflects the capacity of firms to select the most 
promising innovation projects thanks to a formal evaluation of the probability of success, a 
systematic storage of innovative ideas and the use of a knowledge codification system. The 
second one reflects the extent to which firms assess the potential barriers to innovative 
projects beforehand. 
 
The Barriers Variables 
There are two kinds of barriers-related variables coming from two factorial analyses of several sub-
competencies of the basic survey data (see appendix 2 and Peeters and van Pottelsberghe, 2003). 
 
   The first one reflects the perceived limitations of the patent system that might reduce the 
firms’ use of the patent system. A single factorial axis enables to efficiently summarize all 
barriers to the use of the patent system assessed in the survey. The coordinates of firms on 
this factorial axis constitutes a variable that accounts for the cost of fees and protection, the 
lack of effectiveness of the patent protection, the disclosure of important information and the 
lack of information on the intellectual property system.  
   The second one reflects the barriers to innovation. Three variables are built using the firms’ 
coordinates on three factorial axes representing three categories of barriers to innovation. 
These variables are barriers specific to internal organization issues, barriers due to cost and 
risk issues, and barriers specific to external use of innovation. The internal barrier variable 
represents the firm’s internal rigidities, its employees’ resistance to change, its lack of 
relevant competencies, time constraints, a lack of communication and a lack of leadership. 
The risks- and costs-related barriers are the high costs and high economic risks associated 
with innovation and the lack of financial resources. The external barriers come from the 
customers’ rigidities and a lack of reaction to new products, and from inappropriate public 
regulations. Similarly to their potential effect on the firms’ innovation activities, these 
barriers might have a negative impact on the firms’ patent portfolio. 
 
The Econometric Framework 
A logit model is used to estimate the equation related to the probability for a firm to have at least one 
patent. It is written as follows:  
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i = .  * i y is the latent dependent variable that represents some decision 
criteria. If  * i y  is positive the firm has a patent portfolio with a least one patent. If  * i y  is 
negative the firm has no patent portfolio. 
 
A negative binomial model is used to estimate the equation related to the breadth of the firms’ patent 
portfolio. This method is relevant for four main reasons. First, as a count model it accounts for the 
non-negativity and discreteness of the data. Second, as opposed to the poisson model it allows the 
conditional mean and variance of the dependent variable to be different. Third, the coefficients can be 
estimated using the pseudo-maximum likelihood approach that yields robust estimates even if the 
distribution is not correctly specified. Finally, it enables to correct for possible heteroscedasticity 













i i NB x z        ( m o d e l   2 )  
Where  ) ..... ( 2 1 ip i i x x x X t
i = is the vector of explicative variables, 
i x
i e
' β λ = is the 
conditional mean of the dependent variable, and θ   a parameter that enables the 
introduction of some heterogeneity in the model (if θ   = 0, the poisson and the 
negative binomial model are equivalent). 
 
Estimates based on a censored logistic model are provided for comparison in appendix 5. They 
confirm and validate the results obtained with the negative binomial model. 
4. Empirical  Results 
As a preliminary step it is useful to analyze the correlation matrix of all the variables included in the 
econometric model. The matrix is presented in appendix 4. The correlation coefficients between the 
partnerships, information sources and projects selection variables are relatively high. Therefore, in 
order to avoid potential multicollinearity biases, all the variables have not been introduced 
simultaneously in the model. Five different models (see columns 1 to 5 in table 2) have been estimated. 
Model 1 is the basic model including the control and strategic variables, except the collaboration 
partners. All the subsequent models add to this basic model different types of variables. Model 2 
includes the two partnerships variables, model 3 includes the two information sources variables, model 
4 includes the two projects selection variables and model 5 includes the four barriers variables. For 
each model, the first column relates to the logit specification, i.e. the probability for a firm to have at 
least one patent, and the second column relates to the negative binomial specification, i.e. the breadth 
of the patent portfolio.
7 
 
Some correlations are important to highlight since they prove helpful for the interpretation of the 
econometric results. The highest correlations concern scientific partnerships. Firms that collaborate 
with scientific institutions are mainly large HT firms, active in concentrated industries, and operating 
in a relatively high number of countries. They invest a large share of their R&D budget in basic and 
applied research and give a high importance to both product and process innovation. In terms of 
competencies they rely on outside information relatively more than other firms and are better at 
                                                       
7 Due to the risk of multicollinearity the extended model including all categories of variables simultaneously is not presented 
but the results are provided in appendix 5. The first column relates to the logit specification and the second column shows the 
coefficients obtained with the negative binomial specification. The results of the censored logistic specification are presented 
in the third column to check the robustness of the estimates. These estimates with all variables confirm the results of models 
1 to 5 in table 2, except for a few variables for which the estimated parameters are less significant due to multicollinearity.   13 
codifying and selecting ideas. They also perceive more limitations of the patenting system than other 
firms.  
 
There is a positive relationship between the number of countries a firm is operating in and the strategic 
importance it gives to product innovation. In other words, it seems that being active on the 
international market requires more innovative products in order to stay competitive. The correlation 
between the use of external sources of information and the capacity to codify and store ideas is also 
high and significant. The firms that actively seek for outside information seem to be competent in 
knowledge and information management. 
 
- Insert table 2 around here - 
 
The Control Variables (model 1 in table 2) 
 
The firm size has no impact on the probability for a firm to have a patent portfolio but it has a positive 
effect on the breadth of its patent portfolio. This positive relationship between a firm number of 
employees and its patenting performances matches the results of many studies in the field [Crépon et 
al. (1996), Brouwer and Kleinknecht (1999), Baldwin et al. (2001), and van Ophem et al. (2001)]. It 
means that large firms are either more innovative than small firms or that they have a larger propensity 
to patent. Large firms are indeed more likely to have a patent department responsible for all patent 
applications and the coordination of the whole patent portfolio. Through this department they develop 
an in-house specific expertise that fosters patent applications. Smaller firms have to outsource this 
competence, at a higher cost, which might further reduce their propensity to patent. Finally, large 
firms are better able to afford patent litigations than small firms.  
 
- Insert table 3 around here - 
 
Table 3 is a synthetic table of our results compared to the average results of previous studies in the 
field. It should be noticed that many studies include an indicator of R&D intensity in their equations 
and find a positive impact on firms’ patenting performances. However, due to a lack of data, we do not 
introduce this variable. Instead of that we test the impact of the firms’ involvement in  basic and 
applied research (as opposed to development activities) on the probability to have a patent portfolio 
and on the breadth of this portfolio.  
 
A U-shaped relationship is found between a firm’s age and both the probability of having a patent 
portfolio and the breadth of this portfolio. This tends to suggest that two effects are working in 
opposite directions. On the one hand the need to protect the inventions might be more important for 
younger firms because they have no market power. On the other hand, older firms might have a large 
technological background, and hence, more patents. Actually, the bottom of the U-curve corresponds 
approximately to 50 years. During the first 50 years of the company live its propensity to patent seems 
to decrease. After about 50 years the firm’s use of the patent system goes up. This could be a response 
to young and dynamic entrants in the industry that threaten the old firms’ position. 
 
The C-4 concentration index has a positive and significant coefficient in both the binary and the count 
models
8. This result stands for the efficiency effect to dominates the replacement effect. The 
replacement effect suggests that firms with a high market power invest less in innovation projects 
because they would only replace current gains. At the opposite the efficiency effect calls for higher 
innovation investments from firms that face less competition for the exploitation of their innovations. 
These firms are thus likely to have a higher research output, and hence a larger patent portfolio. In this 
respect these results corroborate the findings of Nielsen (2001).   
 
                                                       
8 When partnerships and barriers variables are introduced in the logit model the concentration index loses some significance, 
with a p-value of 13%.   14 
The industry technological opportunity is also found to have a positive impact on the breadth of the 
firms’ patent portfolio, but not on the probability of patenting. This confirms that sectors with an 
important scientific background patent more than others. Two main explanations might be raised for 
this result. First, scientific and technological inventions best fit the patentability conditions of 
inventive step and non obviousness. Second, such inventions could lead to subsequent inventions by 
competitors or firms in other sectors. The original inventor would probably prefer to patent his 
technology in order to be able to charge eventual followers, either by licensing the technology or by 
filing a patent litigation in case of illegal use of it. The positive link found between the sector 
technological opportunity and the firms’ number of patents matches the findings of Crépon et al. 
(1996) and Brouwer and Kleinknecht (1999). However, it does not mean that firms in lower 
technological opportunity sectors are less innovative. They could be as innovative but launch 
innovations that are less likely to be patented. 
 
The Strategic Variables (Models 1 and 2 in table 2) 
 
The firms’ degree of internationalization, approximated by the number of operating countries, is found 
to positively influence their patenting performances and the probability to have a patent portfolio. This 
can be the result of both the larger potential market and the increased competition international firms 
face that calls for more patent protection. At the opposite, being part of a foreign group does not seem 
to impact on the firms’ patenting performances 
 
The importance firms give to the development of new products has a positive impact on the breadth of 
their patent portfolios. Conversely, a large focus towards process innovation is associated to smaller 
patent portfolios. This matches the eighth hypothesis and corroborates Arundel (2001)’s finding that 
process oriented R&D is associated to a higher importance of secrecy as protection means. The 
disclosure of a process innovation might indeed lead other firms to use the technology, eventually for 
different applications. This might be very harmful since this kind of infringements is difficult to track 
down, and proving the paternity of a new process is uneasy. There is no significant impact of the 
importance of product and process innovation on the probability to have a patent portfolio.  
 
Allocating a large portion of total R&D budget to basic and applied research has a positive effect on 
both the probability for a firm to have at least one patent and on the breadth of its patent portfolio. 
Basic and applied research projects are indeed more likely to lead to scientific breakthrough inventions, 
which are in turn more likely to be patented. 
 
The last type of strategic variables relate to the partnerships firms develop for their research and 
innovation projects. The positive impact already found for the firms’ proximity to scientific 
knowledge, i.e. operating in high technological opportunity sectors and the importance of basic and 
applied research, is confirmed by the positive and highly significant coefficient obtained for the 
partnerships with universities and research institutes. This holds for both the probability of having at 
least one patent and the breadth of the patent portfolio. The partnerships with competitors are also 
associated with better patenting performances, as opposed to the commercial partnerships with 
consultants and vertical partners. One reason for this could be that the need for protection is higher for 
the firms that collaborate with competitors than for the firms that collaborate with consultants or 
vertical partners.  
 
The Competencies Variables (Models 3 and 4 in table 2) 
 
The extent to which firms get information from their customers, suppliers, competitors and consultants 
does not seem to be relevant to differentiate firms’ patenting performances. At the opposite, the 
scientific information firms get from universities and research institutions are an important 
determining factor of the breadth of their patent portfolios. When the impact of the information 
variables is tested alone, the scientific information proves highly significant in the binary model too. 
This variable loses some significance when tested simultaneously with other variables probably   15 
because it is correlated with the importance firms give to the development of new processes and to 
basic and applied research. It is significant at a 12% probability threshold in the binary model. 
 
The competence of ideas storage and codification is significant in both the binary and the count model 
when the projects selection variables are tested separately from the rest of the model. When introduced 
simultaneously with the strategic and control variables, the ideas storage and codification variable 
loses its significance in the binary model.
9 Nevertheless, it is a major determinant of the breadth of 
their patent portfolios. In other words, the more firms focus on the management and codification of 
their knowledge base, the larger is their patent portfolio. The assessment of the potential barriers to 
innovation projects has no impact on the firms’ patenting performances. 
 
The Barriers Variables (Model 5 in table 2) 
 
The perceived ineffectiveness of the patent system does not seem to affect the firms’ patenting 
performances. All firms, with both a high and low propensity to patent, seem to identify the 
shortcomings of the intellectual property systems. Therefore, the perceived barriers to patenting do not 
allow to differentiate firms’ patenting performances. 
 
At the opposite, what is observed for the barriers to innovation matches our expectations: the higher 
the perceived barriers to innovation, the weaker the probability for a firm to have at least one patent, 
and the smaller the firms’ patent portfolio. The most important barriers that discourage firms from 
developing a strong patent portfolio are related to the risks and costs of innovative barriers. The 
internal barriers such as the employee resistance to change, the internal rigidities and the lack of 
relevant competencies have also a negative and highly significant impact on the breadth of the firms’ 
patent portfolios. The effect is less relevant for the external barriers coming from customers and 
regulation. In this respect, the present results do not corroborate the previous findings of Cassiman et 
al. (2001) who show that financial barriers actually have a positive impact on the firms’ propensity to 
patent.  
 
Two general remarks can be made when looking at the 5 models of table 2 simultaneously (and 
summarized in table 3). First, it appears that all the factors affecting the probability to have at least one 
patent also influence significantly the breadth of the patent portfolio. On the other hand, several 
factors affect ‘only’ the breadth of the patent portfolio. In other words, it might be easier to increase 
the propensity to patent innovation when firms already patent than to induce firm to start patenting. A 
learning process seems to be at work. Second, for both the binary logit (the probability to have at least 
one patent) and negative binomial (the breadth of the patent portfolio) estimates, the best fit model is 
Model 2, were only two variables are added to the basic model. Model 2 concerns the strategic 
variables of R&D partnership with universities, research institutes and competitors. The extent to 
which firms decide to effectively collaborate with such institution seems therefore to be one of the key 
characteristics that would induce an improved patenting performance. 
 
                                                       
9 This is probably because of the high correlations with the product and process innovation variables and with the importance 
of basic and applied research.   16 
5. Concluding  Remarks 
The objective of this paper was to better understand the factors that influence large firms’ patenting 
performances, both in term of the probability to have a patent portfolio and in term of the breadth of 
this patent portfolio. In this respect several new hypotheses have been put forward regarding the role 
of innovation competencies, innovation strategy and the perceived barriers to innovation and patenting.  
 
An original survey data on large firms’ innovation competencies and performances in Belgium has 
been used for the empirical implementation. The probability to have at least one patent has been 
analyzed through a binary logit model. The determinants of the breadth of the patent portfolio have 
been estimated with a negative binomial count model. The estimates validate several of the suggested 
hypotheses regarding the determinants of patenting performances. 
 
A first interesting observation is that all the factors affecting the probability to have at least one patent 
also influence significantly the breadth of the patent portfolio. The reverse is not true. Several factors 
affect ‘only’ the breadth of the patent portfolio. In other words, it might be easier to increase the 
propensity to patent innovation when firms already patent than to induce firm to start patenting. A 
learning process seems to be at work. 
 
The firms that show the best patenting performances are large firms operating in highly concentrated 
markets and belong more to high-tech and medium high-tech industries. In addition to these 
‘traditional’ factors, firms with a relatively high patenting performance differentiate themselves in 
several respects related to innovation strategy, innovation competencies and barriers perception: 
  they are closely linked to scientific knowledge through collaboration agreements with universities 
and research institutes, and through their intensive use of scientific information; 
  they devote an important share of their total R&D budget to basic and applied research; 
  they favor new product development, as opposed to new process development; 
  they have a tendency to enter into research collaboration more with competitors than with vertical 
partners and consultants; 
  they have developed an effective ideas storage and codification process; 
  they operate in an important number of different countries, which increases the need for 
protection; 
  They recognize that the most important barriers to innovation are related to cost and risk issues 
and to an internal organizational issues (internal rigidities, resistance to change, and a lack of 
competencies, communication and leadership). 
 
These results all too amply demonstrate that there are several avenues for managerial improvement in 
terms of both innovation strategy and innovation competencies. There is a very strong impact of the 
strategic decision to enter into research collaboration with universities and competitors. This last 
observation provides further validation of the current policies aiming at fostering industry-university 
partnerships. 
 
The factors that were supposed to influence patenting performances but turn out to have no significant 
impact in the two models are the following: 
  belonging to a foreign group; 
  looking for commercial information from consultants, competitors and vertical partners; 
  assessing the potential barriers to individual innovative projects beforehand; 
  the perceived ineffectiveness of the patent system. 
 
The two factors that negatively influence firms’ patenting performances are of particular interest. First, 
the firms that strongly emphasize the development of new processes appear to have smaller patent 
portfolios. This is probably due to a lower effectiveness of the patent system in the case of process 
innovations. Indeed, detecting the imitation of a new process is not easy and the disclosure of technical   17 
information, as required with patents, could be very risky. Second, the internal and cost/risk related 
barriers also reduce the propensity to patent inventions.  
 
There are clearly rooms for policy and managerial implications in this respect. On the policy side, risk 
and cost related barriers could be reduced through appropriate loans and grant or fiscal incentives to 
research, like R&D tax credits. Overcoming internal rigidities is probably a bigger challenge. It would 
involve the educational system and regional culture, as well as a management culture towards 
innovation. The current surge of policies towards a “continuous education system” is potentially 
promising in this respect. 
 
Several new factors have been highlighted as being strong determinants of patenting performances, 
including innovation strategy, innovation competencies and the perceived barriers to innovation and 
patenting. The above findings clearly demonstrate that innovation performances are not exclusively 
related to research activities. R&D is certainly a necessary condition for substantial innovation but is 
far from being sufficient. Several organizational competencies and complementary strategies also play 
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Appendix 1 – Literature Review  
 
Synthetic table of studies on the determinants of firms’ patenting performances. 
Column 1 presents the authors and year of publication of the studies. 
Column 2 shows the dependent variables of the studies: 0 / 1 = Has the firm applied for a patent or not, in a given period? ; 
# A = Number of patents the firm has applied for, in  a given period. 
Columns 3 to 13 present the relationship between the explicative variables and dependent variables included in each study. 
The last two rows indicate which relationship is found most often for each explicative and dependent variable: + : positive 
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Appendix 2 – Construction of the Factorial Axes 
 
The asterisks highlight the variables that contribute the most to the interpretation of the factorial axes, 
and the percentage of the total variance explained by the axes used in this paper. The number of 












SOURCES Factor 1 Factor 2  Factor 3 Percentages
Customers -0.53* -0.38 -0.04 1 1.75 29.22 29.22*
Suppliers -0.53* -0.54 -0.36 2 1.42 23.62 52.84*
Competitors -0.63* -0.29 0.43 3 0.89 14.76 67.60
Consultants -0.72* 0.29 0.16 4 0.78 12.97 80.57
Universities & 5 0.65 10.83 91.41
  research instit. 6 0.52 8.59 100.00
Inside the group -0.40 0.49 -0.69
Principal components analysis, own survey, 2000, 148 firms
Percentages
-0.35 0.75* 0.27
Coordinates on the axes Factors Eigenvalues
IDEAS Cumulated
SELECTION Factor 1 Factor 2  Factor 3 Percentages
Ideas 1 2.28 57.05 57.05*
  storage 2 0.80 19.99 77.04*
Knowledge 3 0.52 12.90 89.94











Coordinates on the axes Factors Eigenvalues
Cumulated
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 1 Factor 2 Percentages
Competitors: YES -1.18 0.84* 8.90 12.00* 0.28 0.14* 1 0.37 37.14 37.14*
                    NO 0.24 -0.17 1.80 2.40 0.28 0.14 2 0.14 14.01 51.15*
Vertical: YES -0.39 -0.28 4.10 5.30 0.34 0.17 3 0.14 13.82 64.97
             NO  0.87 0.61* 9.00 11.80* 0.34 0.17* 4 0.12 11.82 76.79
Research instit: YES -0.78* 0.25 11.50* 3.20 0.59* 0.06 5 0.10 10.11 86.89
                        NO  0.76* -0.25 11.20* 3.10 0.59* 0.06 6 0.09 9.30 96.19
Universities: YES -0.71* 0.22 10.90* 2.70 0.65* 0.06 7 0.04 3.81 100.00
                  NO  0.92* -0.28 14.20* 3.50 0.65* 0.06
Inside group: YES -0.42 0.07 4.10 0.30 0.26 0.01
                   NO  0.62 -0.10 6.00 0.40 0.26 0.01
Consultants: YES -0.55 -1.00* 3.90 34.00* 0.15 0.50*
                   NO  0.28 0.50* 2.00 17.00* 0.15 0.50*
Other firms: YES -0.67 -0.24 7.30 2.40 0.33 0.04
                  NO  0.49 0.17 5.30 1.80 0.33 0.04
Multiple correspondences analysis, own survey, 2000, 148 firms
Factors Eigenvalues Percentages PARTNERSHIPS
Coordinates Contributions Cosinus  squared  21 
Barriers to the use of patents 
 
















BARRIERS Factor 1 Factor 2  Factor 3 Percentages
Cost of fees -0.86* 0.02 0.23 1 5.87 65.26 65.26*
Protection cost -0.86* 0.06 0.23 2 0.89 9.88 75.15
Efficiency lack -0.86* 0.09 -0.08 3 0.71 7.87 83.02
Secrecy better -0.84* 0.27 0.13 4 0.54 6.01 89.03
Market lead better -0.84* 0.00 -0.25 5 0.35 3.94 92.97
Short PLC -0.72* -0.34 -0.51 6 0.26 2.91 95.88
Disclosure risk -0.84* 0.18 0.07 7 0.20 2.23 98.12
Risk of copy -0.91* 0.10 -0.06 8 0.13 1.50 99.61
Lack of information -0.46 -0.80 0.28 9 0.03 0.39 100.00
Principal components analysis, own survey, 2000, 148 firms
Percentages Coordinates on the axes Factors Eigenvalues
INNOVATION Cumulated
BARRIERS Factor 1 Factor 2  Factor 3 Percentages
Economic risk -0.28 -0.80* 0.00 1 3.76 31.33 31.33*
High costs -0.24 -0.83* 0.14 2 2.02 16.86 48.19*
Lack of financing -0.32 -0.58* 0.27 3 1.24 10.33 58.52*
Internal rigidities -0.68* 0.19 0.02 4 1.00 8.32 66.84
Customers 5 0.89 7.39 74.23
  rigidities 6 0.61 5.11 79.34
Resistance to 7 0.54 4.53 83.87
  change 8 0.54 4.47 88.35
Lack of  9 0.42 3.49 91.83
  competencies 10 0.41 3.44 95.27
Customers 11 0.31 2.58 97.85
  reaction lack 12 0.26 2.15 100.00
Public regulations -0.26 -0.33 -0.44*
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Appendix 3 – The Variables  
 
 
NAME CONSTRUCTION / INTERPRETATION TYPE
DEPENDENT VARIABLES:
- Existence of a patent portfolio The firm has at least one patent (yes/no)  0 / 1
- Breadth of the patent portfolio Number of patents in the firm's patent portfolio #
CONTROL VARIABLES:
- # of employees in 2000 Number of employees in the firm in 2000 #
- Firm age Number of years since the creation of the company  #
- Foreign group The firm belongs to a foreing group (yes/no) 0 / 1
- Sector concentration (Sales of the 4 largest firms of the sector / total sales of the sector) * 100 %
- Technological opportunity The firm is active in a high-tech or medium high-tech sector (yes/no) 0 / 1
STRATEGIC VARIABLES:
- # of operating countries Number of countries where the firm has customer contacts #
- New products development 4 or 5 on a 5-points scale for the importance of new products development 0 / 1
- New processes development 4 or 5 on a 5-points scale for the importance of new processes development 0 / 1
- % basic & applied  in R&D % of the total R&D budget allocated to basic and applied research %
Collaboration partners:
- Universities & research institutes Scientific institutions
- Competitors >< consultants & Competitors, as opposed to other commercially related firms
   vertical partners
COMPETENCIES VARIABLES:
Information sources:
- Consultants, competitors &  Commercially related firms as information source for innovation projects
   vertical partners
- Universities & research institutes Scientific institutions as information source for innovation projects
Projects selection:
- Ideas storage and codification The use of systems to store and codify the firm's ideas and knowledge
- Projects barriers assessment The assessment of potential barriers to innovation beforehand
BARRIERS VARIABLES:
- Barriers to patents use The barriers to the use of patents by firms
Barriers to innovation:
- Internal to the firm The internal barriers to innovation (organizational, resistance to change…)
- Risks and costs related The risk and costs related barriers to innovation
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Appendix 4 – The Correlation Matrix 
 
 











































































































































































































































































































































































firm age 0.1400 1
foreign group -0.0684 -0.0244 1
sector concentration 0.0072 0.2559* -0.1137 1
technological opportunity 0.0331 0.0417 0.0018 0.1387 1
# operating countries 0.0824 0.1359 0.0725 0.1470 0.2305* 1
new products 0.1301 -0.0128 -0.0560 0.1904 0.0689 0.3456* 1
new processes 0.0101 0.0626 -0.0346 0.1528 0.0957 0.0366 0.1744 1
basic & applied research  -0.0046 0.0406 -0.0901 0.1205 0.0764 0.1345 0.1445 0.2043* 1
scientific partners 0.2550* 0.1615 0.1121 0.2690* 0.2479* 0.2882* 0.2314* 0.2568* 0.3209* 1
competitors partners -0.0673 0.0603 -0.0583 -0.0237 0.0147 0.0199 -0.1758 0.1445 0.1742 0.0453 1
commercial information 0.1475 0.1521 0.0612 0.1545 -0.0310 0.1185 0.0380 0.1558 0.1694 0.3063* -0.1303 1
scientific information 0.1624 -0.1088 0.1856 -0.0381 0.1150 -0.0338 0.0012 0.2554* 0.3049* 0.4423* 0.1769 0.0609 1
ideas storage & codification 0.1703 0.0803 0.0455 0.2451* 0.1526 0.1693 0.2382* 0.2132* 0.2743* 0.5624* -0.1371 0.3956* 0.3523* 1
projects barriers assessment -0.1950 0.0410 0.0384 -0.0296 -0.0134 -0.0372 -0.0917 -0.0362 0.1335 -0.0010 -0.1951 0.0006 -0.2119* -0.0786 1
barriers to patents 0.0248 0.1452 -0.2240* 0.3115* 0.0228 0.2576* 0.2705* 0.0501 0.3765* 0.2352* -0.0735 0.0543 -0.0620 0.0680 0.0086 1
internal barriers 0.0922 0.2635* -0.0747 0.1750 -0.0565 0.0441 0.1081 -0.0373 -0.3133* -0.0716 -0.1606 0.1294 -0.0854 -0.0767 -0.1100 0.0275 1
costs & risks barriers -0.1087 0.0369 -0.0706 -0.1240 0.0851 -0.2474* -0.1120 0.0223 0.0210 0.0117 0.1010 -0.0946 0.0533 0.0311 -0.0169 0.0234 -0.1313 1
external barriers 0.0446 0.0750 -0.0748 0.0382 -0.0869 -0.0926 -0.0024 0.0562 0.1477 0.1511 0.0979 0.0095 0.1468 0.1798 0.1721 -0.0130 -0.0217 -0.0418 1  24 
coefficient p-value coefficient p-value coefficient p-value
control variables
nb of employees in 2000 0.0010 0.4096 0.0006*** 0.0029 0.0384*** 0.0000
firm age -0.0917** 0.0380 -0.0740*** 0.0002 -2.0637* 0.0750
age square 0.0011*** 0.0043 0.0007*** 0.0000 0.0226** 0.0135
foreign group -0.1474 0.9228 0.1443 0.7592 -0.5827 0.9819
sector concentration 0.0138 0.7692 0.0250 0.1012 0.5681 0.4315
technological opportunity -0.1492 0.8786 1.5354** 0.0241 48.6059* 0.0706
strategic variables
nb of operating countries 0.0620** 0.0322 0.0077 0.5015 -0.0160 0.9685
new products development 1.9146 0.3131 3.1297*** 0.0000 110.5048*** 0.0049
new processes development -3.3716*** 0.0030 -1.4982*** 0.0005 -90.4389*** 0.0049
% basic & applied research in R&D 0.0504*** 0.0072 0.0168 0.1117 0.3561 0.5576
collaboration partners:
- universities & research institutes 5.0812*** 0.0000 2.3262*** 0.0000 109.6607*** 0.0034
- competitors >< consultants & 6.1112** 0.0194 1.9945*** 0.0026 105.6626** 0.0101
   vertical partners
competencies variables
information sources:
- consultants, competitors &  -0.4996 0.3418 -0.2132 0.2585 -16.7159 0.1010
   vertical partners
- universities & research institutes 0.9354* 0.0819 0.2396 0.4942 5.4565 0.7132
projects selection:
- ideas storage and codification 0.2054 0.6657 0.2459 0.4103 16.6697 0.1630
- projects barriers assessment 0.6862 0.2017 0.4779** 0.0266 14.8356 0.3499
barriers variables
- barriers to patents use 0.4033 0.1619 0.1577 0.1120 2.4786 0.7278
barriers to innovation:
- internal to the firm 0.0771 0.8085 -0.4651*** 0.0018 -14.6507* 0.0526
- risks and costs related -1.4562** 0.0431 -0.6560*** 0.0023 -21.7010* 0.0542
- external to the firm -1.4727** 0.0173 -0.2937 0.1574 -23.9605** 0.0373









Binary Logit Censored Logistic Negative Binomial
97 97 97


























Extended model including all explicative variables simultaneously, own survey, 2000. 
* significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level. 
                                                       
10 Censored logistic model:   
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i = .  * i z is the underlying true number of patents in the firm patent portfolio.   25 
Tables and figures to be inserted in main text 
 






- # of employees in 2000     [hyp 1]
- firm age     [hyp 11]
- foreign group     [hyp 5]
- sector concentration      [hyp 2]
- technological opportunity     [hyp 3]
STRATEGIC VARIABLES:
- internationalization     [hyp 12]
- new products development     [hyp 8a]
- new processes development   [hyp 8b]
- basic & applied research     [hyp 14]
collaboration partners:     [hyp 6]
- universities & research institutes
- competitors >< consultants &
   vertical partners
COMPETENCIES VARIABLES:
information sources:     [hyp 7]
- consultants, competitors & 
   vertical partners
- universities & research institutes
projects selection:     [hyp 13]
- ideas storage and codification
- projects barriers assessment
BARRIERS VARIABLES:
- barriers to patents use     [hyp 9]
barriers to innovation:     [hyp 10]
- internal to the firm
- risks and costs related








at least 1 patent or not  26 





































Basic statistics, own survey, 2000, 97 firms. 
The first two rows present summary statistics for the dependent variables of the two econometric models. The following rows 
present summary statistics for of the 10 explanatory variables. 
Column 2 shows the type of variable. Column 3 shows the percentage of firms that have answered “yes” in case of a binary 
variable. Column 4 shows the average answer in case of a numerical variable. The last column gives the standard deviation.    
 
 










At least 1 patent?  0 / 1 45% 0.50
Number of patents  # 33 129.83
Firms' characteristics:
Number of employees in 2000  # 595 1102.38
Firm age # 34 29.52
Foreign firm?  0 / 1 44% 0.50
Sector characteristics:
Sector concentration  % 63.51 26.04
HT / MH ?  0 / 1 37% 0.49
Strategic variables:
Number of operating countries  # 25 30.32
R&D activity?  0 / 1 93% 0.26
% of basic & applied in R&D  % 35.18 27.43
Importance of:
     new products development 0 / 1 32% 0.47
     new processes development 0 / 1 42% 0.50
std. dev. VARIABLES Type % of yes mean  27 
coefficient p-value coefficient p-value coefficient p-value coefficient p-value coefficient p-value coefficient p-value coefficient p-value coefficient p-value coefficient p-value coefficient p-value
control variables
nb of employees in 2000 0.0004 0.2325 0.0008*** 0.0021 0.0002 0.5203 0.0005*** 0.0009 0.0005 0.2990 0.0005** 0.0116 0.0004 0.2697 0.0006*** 0.0000 0.0006 0.1668 0.0007*** 0.0000
firm age -0.0490 0.1110 -0.0847*** 0.0001 -0.0593** 0.0198 -0.0669*** 0.0004 -0.0390 0.1269 -0.0678*** 0.0019 -0.0480 0.1080 -0.0702*** 0.0003 -0.0560* 0.0845 -0.0820*** 0.0002
age square 0.0005* 0.0554 0.0007*** 0.0000 0.0006*** 0.0005 0.0006*** 0.0001 0.0005** 0.0212 0.0006*** 0.0002 0.0005** 0.0495 0.0005*** 0.0001 0.0007** 0.0408 0.0007*** 0.0000
foreign group -0.3488 0.5486 1.2700** 0.0111 -0.2090 0.7721 0.4586 0.2618 -0.6240 0.3461 0.7698 0.1683 -0.3115 0.5992 1.2164** 0.0139 -0.3142 0.6646 0.4042 0.4277
sector concentration 0.0252* 0.0549 0.0453*** 0.0001 0.0227 0.1234 0.0333*** 0.0013 0.0265* 0.0748 0.0385*** 0.0001 0.0253* 0.0517 0.0312*** 0.0021 0.0277 0.1063 0.0509*** 0.0000
technological opportunity 0.4051 0.4963 2.2809*** 0.0003 0.1311 0.8671 1.3128** 0.0379 0.1714 0.7799 1.5187** 0.0284 0.4299 0.4772 1.8432*** 0.0032 0.6664 0.3197 2.1256*** 0.0015
strategic variables
nb of operating countries 0.0232** 0.0215 0.0162** 0.0505 0.0272 0.1065 0.0124* 0.0926 0.0297** 0.0209 0.0280** 0.0136 0.0227** 0.0261 0.0144* 0.0550 0.0156 0.1384 0.0205*** 0.0060
new products development 0.9065 0.1367 3.6720*** 0.0000 1.9596** 0.0156 3.2521*** 0.0000 0.9460 0.1401 3.0078*** 0.0000 0.8988 0.1314 2.9336*** 0.0000 1.0534 0.1313 3.2644*** 0.0000
new processes development -0.6364 0.2809 -1.2166** 0.0225 -2.0347** 0.0225 -1.8446*** 0.0000 -0.7681 0.2398 -1.4398*** 0.0047 -0.6799 0.2546 -1.2905** 0.0105 -0.6503 0.2856 -0.5118 0.2772
% basic & applied research in R&D 0.0379*** 0.0007 0.0380*** 0.0001 0.0374*** 0.0068 0.0249*** 0.0008 0.0341*** 0.0027 0.0229*** 0.0072 0.0387*** 0.0008 0.0326*** 0.0001 0.0344*** 0.0074 0.0300*** 0.0076
collaboration partners:
- universities & research institutes 2.4354*** 0.0001 2.2686*** 0.0000
- competitors >< consultants & 3.2009** 0.0120 1.3781*** 0.0087
   vertical partners
competencies variables
information sources:
- consultants, competitors &  -0.1277 0.6138 -0.0161 0.9333
   vertical partners
- universities & research institutes 0.5279 0.1178 1.0205*** 0.0039
projects selection:
- ideas storage and codification 0.0258 0.8965 0.5889*** 0.0063
- projects barriers assessment -0.1996 0.5716 -0.0116 0.9635
barriers variables
- barriers to patents use 0.1946 0.1617 -0.1275 0.3605
barriers to innovation:
- internal to the firm -0.3006 0.1878 -0.5667*** 0.0022
- risks and costs related -0.4281* 0.0934 -0.3887* 0.0923
- external to the firm -0.4395 0.1115 0.2079 0.4031
C -3.7626*** 0.0000 -6.1644*** 0.0000 -3.2564 0.0080 -4.1684*** 0.0000 -3.8181*** 0.0001 -4.6449*** 0.0000 -3.7680*** 0.0001 -4.4091*** 0.0000 -4.0270*** 0.0010 -6.4711*** 0.0000
# observations
Log-likelihood -43.6268 -252.1520 -31.6894 -210.4609 -41.8393 -237.0277 -43.4394 -242.0128 -38.7914 -232.5785
Mc Fadden R-squared 0.3471 0.5257 0.3738 0.3499 0.4194
Pseudo R-squared 0.4249 0.5200 0.4594 0.4480 0.4695
- Model 5 - - Model 1 - - Model 2 - - Model 3 - - Model 4 -
Binary Logit Negative Binomial Binary Logit Negative Binomial Binary Logit Negative Binomial
97 97 97 97 97 97
Binary Logit Negative Binomial
97 97 97 97
Binary Logit Negative Binomial
 
Own survey, 2000, * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level. White corrected estimations for potential heteroscedasticity.   28 
Table 3 –   Synthetic table of our results compared to the    
  literature 
 
 
The column “literature” presents the average results of the existing literature summarized in appendix 1. 
0 / 1 A = The firm applied for a least one patent or not; 0 / 1 P = The firm has at least one patent in its patent portfolio; # A 
= Number of patents the firm has applied for; # P = Number of patents in the firm patent portfolio. 
+ : positive relationship; - : negative relationship; /\ : inverted U-shaped relationship; ns : non significant relationship; 





0 / 1 A # A binomial
0 / 1 P # P
CONTROL VARIABLES :
- # of employees in 2000     [hyp 1] ++ n s +
- firm age     [hyp 11] -U U
- foreign group     [hyp 6] +n s n s
- sector concentration      [hyp 2] " + / - " ns + +
- technological opportunity     [hyp 3] ++ n s +
STRATEGIC VARIABLES:
- internationalization     [hyp 12] ++
- new products development     [hyp 8a] ns +
- new processes development   [hyp 8b] ns -
- research activities     [hyp 4] ++
- basic and applied research     [hyp 14]  ++
collaboration partners:     [hyp 5] ++
- universities & research institutes + +
- competitors >< consultants & + +
   vertical partners
COMPETENCIES VARIABLES:
information sources:     [hyp 7] +
- consultants, competitors &  ns ns
   vertical partners
- universities & research institutes + +
projects selection:     [hyp 13]
- ideas storage and codification ns +
- projects barriers assessment ns ns
BARRIERS VARIABLES:
- barriers to patents use     [hyp 9] - " - / ns " ns ns
barriers to innovation:     [hyp 10]
- internal to the firm ns -
- risks and costs related - -
- external to the firm ns ns
OUR RESULTS LITERATURE